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The neural basis of mental imagery has been investigated by localizing the underlying
neural networks, mostly in motor and perceptual systems, separately. However,
how modality-specific representations are top-down induced and how the action and
perception systems interact in the context of mental imagery is not well understood.
Imagined speech production (“articulation imagery”), which induces the kinesthetic
feeling of articulator movement and its auditory consequences, provides a new angle
because of the concurrent involvement of motor and perceptual systems. On the basis
of previous findings in mental imagery of speech, we argue for the following regarding
the induction mechanisms of mental imagery and the interaction between motor and
perceptual systems: (1) Two distinct top-down mechanisms, memory retrieval and motor
simulation, exist to induce estimation in perceptual systems. (2) Motor simulation is
sufficient to internally induce the representation of perceptual changes that would be
caused by actual movement (perceptual associations); however, this simulation process
only has modulatory effects on the perception of external stimuli, which critically depends
on context and task demands. Considering the proposed simulation-estimation processes
as common mechanisms for interaction between motor and perceptual systems, we
outline how mental imagery (of speech) relates to perception and production, and how
these hypothesized mechanisms might underpin certain neural disorders.
Keywords: internal forward model, efference copy, corollary discharge, sensory-motor integration, mirror neurons,
auditory hallucination, stuttering, phantom limb
INTRODUCTION
Mental imagery can be characterized as a quasi-perceptual
experience, induced in the absence of external stimulation.
Neuroimaging studies have shown that common neural sub-
strates mediate mental imagery and the corresponding percep-
tual processes, such as in visual (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1999;
O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000), auditory (e.g., Zatorre et al.,
1996; Kraemer et al., 2005), somatosensory (e.g., Yoo et al., 2003;
Zhang et al., 2004), and olfactory domains (e.g., Bensafi et al.,
2003; Djordjevic et al., 2005). The demonstration of activation
in corresponding perceptual regions during mental imagery has
provided strong evidence to support the claim that the percep-
tual experience during mental imagery is mediated by modality-
specific neural representations (see the review by Kosslyn et al.,
2001). However, the top-down “induction mechanism” for the
neural activity mediating mental imagery is not well understood.
We focus here on the role of the motor system in the construc-
tion of perceptual experience in mental imagery. We propose a
motor-based mechanism that is an alternative (additional) mech-
anism to Kosslyn’s memory-attention-based account (Kosslyn,
1994, 2005; Kosslyn et al., 1994): planned action is simulated
in motor systems to internally derive the representation of per-
ceptual changes that would be caused by the actual action
(perceptual associations). We suggest that the deployment of
these two distinct mechanisms depends on task demands and
contextual influence. Studies of mental imagery of speech are
summarized to provide evidence for the proposed account—
and for the coexistence of both mechanisms. We discuss the
motor-to-sensory integration process and propose some working
hypotheses regarding certain neural and neuropsychiatric disor-
ders from the perspective of the proposed internal simulation and
estimation mechanisms.
DIFFERENT ROUTES FOR INDUCING MENTAL IMAGES
MENTAL IMAGERY OF PERCEPTION AS MEMORY RETRIEVAL
(DIRECT SIMULATION)
Mental imagery has been proposed to be essentially a mem-
ory retrieval process. That is, perceptual experience is simulated
by reconstructing stored perceptual information in modality-
specific cortices (Kosslyn, 1994, 2005; Kosslyn et al., 1994). In
particular, the process, guided by attention, retrieves object and
spatial properties stored in long-term memory to reactivate the
topographically organized sensory cortices that represent the
object features. Through top-down (re)construction of the neural
representation that is similar to the result of bottom-up percep-
tual processes, the perceptual experience can be re-elicited with-
out the presence of any physical stimuli during mental imagery.
This attention-guided memory retrieval process has been demon-
strated, for example, in the visual imagery of faces (Ishai et al.,
2002).
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Mental imagery is further hypothesized to be a predictive
process (for future perceptual states), in which the dynamics
of perceptual experience can be retrieved/calculated and recon-
structed internally (Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). That is, given
an initial point, the series of future perceptual states can be
internally simulated by following the regularity (temporal and
causal constraints) stored in declarative memory (general knowl-
edge). The mapping between internal simulation and the per-
ception of external stimulation is thought not to be necessarily
isomorphic (Goldman, 1989), as only the essential intermedi-
ate states are required to have a one-to-one mapping (Fisher,
2006). Because this proposed simulation process is executed
entirely within perceptual domains on the basis of memory
retrieval—without any representational transformation between
motor and perceptual systems—we refer to this account as direct
simulation.
MENTAL IMAGERY OF MOTOR ACTION AS ESTIMATION DERIVING
FROM SIMULATION
Motor imagery is thought to be the process that internally sim-
ulates planned actions, by activating similar neural substrates
that mediate motor intention and preparation (Jeannerod, 1995,
2001; Decety, 1996). Numerous studies have demonstrated both
frontal and parietal activity during motor imagery (Decety et al.,
1994; Lotze et al., 1999; Gerardin et al., 2000; Ehrsson et al.,
2003; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Dechent et al., 2004; Meister et al.,
2004; Nikulin et al., 2008). However, motor system activation
does not necessarily link to the kinesthetic feeling generated
during motor imagery. The residual neural activity, resulting
from the absence of external somatosensory feedback, is thought
to mediate the kinesthetic experience during motor imagery
(Jeannerod, 1994, 1995). The implicit assumption of the “resid-
ual activity account” is that the internal motor simulation during
imagery should be transformed into the same representational
format as the one resulting from somatosensory feedback. That
is, the somatosensory consequences of motor simulation should
be estimated. This is consistent with the view that parietal
rather than frontal motor regions mediate motor awareness
(Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009). In support of the claim that pari-
etal regions mediate somatosensory estimation, direct current
stimulation over parietal cortex induces false belief of movement
(Desmurget et al., 2009); parietal lesions also impaired the tem-
poral precision of performing motor imagery tasks (Sirigu et al.,
1996). Cumulatively, the results suggest that motor simulation in
frontal cortex converges in parietal regions to form a kinesthetic
representation.
The internal transformation between motor simulation and
somatosensory estimation has been proposed in the context of
internal forward models in the motor control literature [see the
review by Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000)]. The core presup-
position is that the neural system can predict the perceptual
consequences by internal simulating a copy of a planned action
command (the efference copy). Mental imagery has been linked
to the concept of internal forward models by the argument that
the subjective feeling in mental imagery is the result of the
internal estimation of the perceptual consequences following the
internal simulation of an action (Grush, 2004). Consistent with
this hypothesis, we propose here that the kinesthetic feeling in
motor imagery is the result of somatosensory estimation, derived
from internal simulation that closely mimics the dynamics of a
motor action. We refer to this account as motor simulation and
estimation.
The motor simulation and estimation account differs from the
direct simulation (memory retrieval) account in that it requires a
transformation between motor and somatosensory systems. Our
question here, though, extends beyond this: can a motor simula-
tion deliver perceptual consequences that extend to other sensory
domains (such as visual and auditory) as well? If so, internal sim-
ulation and estimation processes would serve as an additional
path to induce modality-specific neural representations similar to
the ones induced on the basis of memory retrieval. In the next
section, we discuss this possibility in the framework of internal
forward models and propose a sequential simulation and estima-
tion account.We will use the interaction ofmotor, somatosensory,
and auditory systems in speech production as an example to illus-
trate such internal cascaded processes, which can generalize to
other sensory domains.
MENTAL IMAGERY OF SPEECH AS SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION
Perception and production systems are functionally connected:
perceptual systems analyze the sensory input generated by self
actions; the motor system is also regulated by perceptual feed-
back to perform updates on actions in the future. For exam-
ple, when people talk, they move their articulators, feel the
movement, and hear the self-produced speech that can be used
to detect and correct any pronunciation errors. The temporal
sequence of physical articulation, proprioception of the articu-
lators, and auditory perception of one’s own vocalization makes
it possible—on the basis of co-occurrence and associative learn-
ing during development—to create internal connections among
the neural processes that mediate motor action, somatosen-
sory feedback, and auditory perception. After establishing the
connections, motor commands can cycle internally through
somatosensory regions and “reach” auditory regions. That is,
the estimation in the somatosensory system can serve as a link
between motor and auditory systems. Theoretically, such a cas-
caded estimation architecture has been hypothesized by Hesslow
(2002). Anatomically and functionally, the connections between
parietal regions and auditory temporal regions have also been
demonstrated (Schroeder et al., 2001; Foxe et al., 2002; Fu et al.,
2003).
On the basis of recent neurophysiological (MEG) studies, we
proposed that a process of auditory inference after somatosen-
sory estimation occurs during overt speech processing [Figure 1;
adapted from Tian and Poeppel (2010)]. Specifically, the esti-
mation of auditory consequences relies on the somatosensory
estimation that derives from the simulation of planned action.
That is, the internal auditory prediction is the result of a coor-
dinate transformation from the somatosensory to the auditory
domain. This sequential estimation mechanism (motor plan→
somatosensory estimation → auditory prediction/estimation)
can derive detailed auditory predictions that are then com-
pared with auditory feedback for self-monitoring and online
control.
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FIGURE 1 | Model of speech processing and its implication for mental
imagery of speech. The internal simulation and estimation model
proposed as a second route to generate mental images. The motor
systems that mediate action preparation carry out the same functions in
mental imagery of speech, but only perform motor simulation, in the
sense that the planned motor commands are truncated along the path to
primary motor cortex and are not executed (the red cross over external
outputs). A copy of such planned motor commands (motor efference copy)
is processed internally and is used to estimate the associated
somatosensory consequences. A copy of the somatosensory estimation is
further sent to modality-specific areas, and the associated perceptual
consequences that would be produced by the overt action are estimated.
The quasi-perceptual experience during mental imagery (the feeling of
movement of the articulators and the feeling of auditory perception in the
case of articulation imagery) is the result of residual activity from these
internal estimation processes, because of the absence of cancellation from
the external feedback (the red crosses over external somatosensory and
perceptual feedback).
In the case of the mental imagery of speech, we propose
that the quasi-perceptual experience of articulator movement
and the subsequent auditory percept are induced by the same
sequential estimation mechanism. However, the “cancellation”
deriving from somatosensory and auditory feedback, which is
generated by the overt outputs during production, is absent in the
imagery case (Figure 1). Therefore, similar to the case of motor
imagery (Jeannerod, 1994, 1995), the feeling of articulator move-
ment is the result of residual somatosensory representation result-
ing from motor simulation; the subsequent auditory perceptual
experience, we suggest, is the residual auditory representation
from the second estimation stage.
On the basis of sequential estimation account, particular neu-
ral activity patterns for the two sequential estimates are predicted
to occur in a temporal order. Specifically, an auditory pat-
tern should follow a somatosensory one during mental imagery
of speech. Applying a novel multivariate technique (Tian and
Huber, 2008; Tian et al., 2011) to MEG data, we observed such
a temporal order for somatosensory and auditory estimations
during articulation imagery (Tian and Poeppel, 2010), mani-
fested in the sequential activity patterns over modality-specific
regions at different latencies (Figure 2). A left parietal response
pattern was observed during articulation imagery at the same
latency as when motor responses occurred in the articulation
condition1. Following such a left parietal response pattern, a
second pattern was identified at a latency of 150–170ms after
the parietal response. This second pattern was very similar to the
response elicited by external auditory stimuli. Moreover, in a fur-
ther experimental condition, hearing imagery, we also observed
an auditory-like neural response pattern; however, its latency
was faster than the same auditory pattern observed in articula-
tion imagery. The existence of these two spatially highly similar
auditory-like neural representations, with different latencies for
articulation versus hearing imagery tasks, suggests that the same
(or strikingly similar) neural representations can be generated
either by internal estimation or by memory retrieval, based on
contextual variation and task demands.
Note that the auditory estimation is presumably formed along
the canonical auditory hierarchy, but the induction process will
be in reversed order. That is to say, the abstract representation
is (re-)constructed first in higher level associative areas and con-
veyed to a perceptual-sensory representation in lower areas. The
observation of neural activity in the posterior superior temporal
1Because previous findings suggest that the time courses for completing exe-
cution and imagery are comparable (Decety and Michel, 1989; Decety et al.,
1989; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996), the observed neural responses over parietal
regions presumably mediate somatosensory estimation.
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FIGURE 2 | Results from Tian and Poeppel (2010). The sequential
estimation during articulation imagery revealed by MEG recordings. All
plots are MEG topographies (response patterns) when participants actually
speak (lower row), imagine hearing (middle row), and imagine speaking (top
row). The activity patterns in the first column are temporally aligned with
the onset of articulation movement. At a similar latency, bilateral frontal,
bilateral temporal, and left lateralized parietal activity patterns are observed
in articulation, hearing imagery, and articulation imagery conditions. In
articulation imagery, about 150–170ms later after the parietal activity,
bilateral temporal activity is also observed. All the bilateral temporal activity
patterns in hearing imagery and articulation imagery resemble the
topography of the auditory response during actual hearing (highlighted in a
blue box, response pattern when participants listen to the same auditory
stimuli as in other conditions).
sulcus (pSTS) during silent speaking (Price et al., 2011) could be
the result of an earlier reconstruction. Whereas the observations
of similarity between responses to mental imagery and to exter-
nal stimulation, such as in visual (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1999) and
auditory (e.g., Figure 2, Tian and Poeppel, 2010) domains, are
the results of process continuation to lower perceptual-sensory
regions. How much further back the reconstruction process
might go seems to depend on the sensory modality and demands
of the imagery tasks (Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003; Kraemer
et al., 2005; Zatorre and Halpern, 2005).
INTERNAL SIMULATION-ESTIMATION AND RELATION
TO SENSORY-MOTOR INTEGRATION
Mental imagery of speech exemplifies a top-down mechanism for
sensory-motor integration. The proposal here is motor simula-
tion and sequential estimation. In the first part of this section,
we describe the nature of this sequential transformation between
motor, somatosensory, and other perceptual systems. We pos-
tulate that there is a one-to-one transformation between motor
simulation and somatosensory estimation, as well as isomorphic
mapping between somatosensory estimation and subsequent
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FIGURE 3 | Sufficiency and necessity between motor simulation and
perceptual estimation. The characteristics of the proposed motor
simulation and perceptual estimation processes, and the nature of motor
involvement during perceptual tasks. The internal motor simulation can take
a similar path as motor preparation to derive a corresponding motor
representation that in turn derives associated perceptual representations in
a one-to-one fashion. Such one-to-one mapping is the same as the one in
the external connections between the similar motor action and perceptual
consequences. In the other direction, when the perceptual representation
is needed, different paths can be taken. It can rely on memory retrieval to
directly recreate the perceptual representation. It can also take another less
demanding path that relies on the motor simulation to derive the associated
perceptual representation.
perceptual estimation (Figure 3). The entire transformation
process is carried out in a continuous manner, beginning with
motor simulation, then somatosensory estimation, and ending
with modality-specific perceptual estimation. In the second part
of this section, we argue that the implementation of motor simu-
lation depends on context and task demands and may only exert
modulatory effects on perception.
MOTOR-TO-SENSORYMAPPING: ISOMORPHISM VIA ESTABLISHED
CONNECTIONS
The central idea underpinning motor simulation and subsequent
perceptual estimation is the conjectured one-to-one mapping or
isomorphism between mental and physical processes. This iso-
morphism has been proposed for motor simulation (Jeannerod,
1994) and visual mental rotation (Shepard and Cooper, 1986):
the intermediate stages of the internal process must have a one-
to-one correspondence to intermediate stages of an actualized
physical process. We extend this isomorphism to the associations
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between the motor simulation and perceptual estimation: the
one-to-one mapping between the trajectory of motor simulation
and perceptual estimation is a close analog to the causal relation
between motor outputs and perceptual changes. That is, not only
should the starting and ending points of an action simulation lead
to the initiation and results of perceptual estimation, but interme-
diate points on this action simulation trajectory should result in a
sequence of perceptual estimates, even though no external signals
are physically presented. Notice that the analogy between inter-
nal simulation-estimation and external action-perception does
not require the preservation of first-order isomorphism: only
the one-to-one relation in the transformation of internal rep-
resentation from motor to perceptual systems is required, as if
the action was actually performed and the percept was actually
induced.
The isomorphic transformation frommotor to perceptual sys-
tems relies on the established internal associations between motor
and perceptual representations, which are presumably formed
following the causal and ecologically valid sequential occurrence
of action-perception pairs, through the mechanisms of associa-
tive learning (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). For example, the
movement of articulators can induce somatosensory feedback
and subsequent auditory perception of one’s own speech. On the
basis of the occurrence order (action first, then somatosensory
activation, followed by auditory perception), an internal associa-
tion can be established to link a particular movement trajectory
of articulators with the specific somatosensory sensation, fol-
lowed by a given auditory perception of speech. Note that we
do not exclude the possible existence of a parallel estimation
process that links motor simulation to somatosensory and audi-
tory systems separately (Guenther et al., 2006; Price et al., 2011).
Such an additional mechanisms which runs in parallel may medi-
ate the early comparison between auditory estimation from an
articulatory plan and intended auditory targets during speech
production (Hickok, 2012). The redundancy of the compensa-
tion in somatosensory and auditory domains offers a hint for
the co-existence of sequential and parallel estimation structures
(Lametti et al., 2012). We suggest that the serial updating struc-
ture as one of the possible underlying estimation mechanisms
naturally follows the biological sequences, providing advantages
in learning and plasticity during development as well as online
speech control.
Speech-induced suppression and enhancement caused by
feedback perturbation provides strong evidence for the one-to-
one mapping between motor simulation and estimation of per-
ceptual consequences. When participants speak and listen to their
own speech, the evoked auditory responses are smaller compared
with the auditory responses to the same speech played back with-
out spoken outputs (Numminen et al., 1999; Houde et al., 2002;
Eliades and Wang, 2003, 2005; Ventura et al., 2009). However,
when the auditory feedback is perturbed (manipulating, e.g.,
pitch or format frequencies), the auditory responses during
speaking become larger compared with the ones during playback
(Eliades andWang, 2008; Tourville et al., 2008; Zheng et al., 2010;
Behroozmand et al., 2011). The suppression caused by articu-
lation demonstrates that an internal signal labels the onset of
movement and down-regulates sensitivity to subsequent auditory
perception (general suppression). However, the enhancement
caused by feedback perturbation suggests that the internal signal
during articulation is not a generic gain control mechanism for
all auditory stimuli, but rather provides a precise perceptual pre-
diction and only blocks the feedback that is identical to the pre-
diction. In other words, there is a one-to-one mapping between
motor simulation and auditory estimation, and the precise audi-
tory consequence can be predicted based on particular motor
trajectory.
The hypothesized intermediate neurocomputational step of
somatosensory estimation that lies between motor simulation
and auditory estimation has also been suggested by recent exper-
iments. The sequential neural activity underlying somatosensory
and auditory estimation has been observed during articulation
imagery using MEG (Tian and Poeppel, 2010), as discussed
above (Figure 2). Lesions over the left pars opercularis (pOp)
in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) as well as adjacent to the
left supramarginal gyrus (SMG) in parietal cortex correlate with
the ability to imagine speech; this demonstrates the possible
neural implementation underlying the proposed simulation and
(somatosensory) estimation (Geva et al., 2011). Moreover, the
causal role of somatosensory feedback in speech perception
has also been demonstrated (Ito et al., 2009). There, partic-
ipants were asked to listen to ambiguous stimuli (e.g., head-
had vowel continuum) while their facial skin was manipulated
with a robotic device. When the skin at the side of mouth
was stretched upward (as in the case of pronouncing “head”),
participants were biased toward hearing the ambiguous sound
as “head.” That is, the somatosensory status affected the audi-
tory perception in a systematic way: there was a one-to-one
representational mapping between somatosensory and auditory
systems.
THE SIMULATION-ESTIMATION PROCESS IN PERCEPTION
The debates surrounding motor theories of perception and cog-
nition [see the review by Scheerer (1984)] have heated up since
the discovery of the putative “mirror neuron system” in mon-
keys (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; see Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004 for a review) and the observation of motor
activity observed during numerous perceptual studies in humans
(e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Buccino et al.,
2001; Wilson et al., 2004). Although these debates are beyond
the scope of this review, the proposed mechanism of sequen-
tial estimation following motor simulation may provide insight
to reconcile some of the observations, providing a top-down
perspective.
We propose, building on arguments in the recent litera-
ture (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Hickok, 2009; Lotto et al.,
2009; Rumiati et al., 2010), that the deployment of motor sim-
ulation in perceptual tasks is (1) strategy-dependent and (2)
exerts modulatory effects on the formation of perceptual rep-
resentations. That is, the selection of motor involvement in
perceptual tasks depends on context and task demands. It is
a top-down strategic step to provide modality-specific repre-
sentations in advance (cf. Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009) and
reduce perceptual variance by generating more precise estima-
tion (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; but also see Pulvermüller
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and Fadiga, 2010 for an opposite view from a embodied
perspective).
The implementation of motor-to-sensory transformations
is strategy-dependent
We describe two types of evidence. First, the recruit-
ment/involvement of motor simulation is influenced by
task demands. For example, motor imagery can be performed
from a “first person” perspective that relies on kinesthetic feeling,
in contrast with when a task is executed from a “third person”
perspective in which the action-related visual changes are recre-
ated (Jeannerod, 1994, 1995). Reaction times of hand rotation
imagery showed an interaction between imagery perspectives
and limb posture: when asked to imagine rotating their hands
from first person perspective, participants responded faster when
their hands were on the lap but slower when their hands are
in the back; the reverse pattern was observed when imagining
from third person perspective (Sirigu and Duhamel, 2001).
Activation in the motor system was observed when participants
were explicitly told to imagine rotating an object with their own
hands, but was absent when they were told to imagine rotating
the same object with a robotic motor (Kosslyn et al., 2001).
Both behavioral and neuroimaging results highlight that the
task demands influence the implementation of neural pathways
that mediate either direct simulation (memory retrieval) or
motor simulation-estimation (transformation between motor
and perceptual systems).
Second, motor-to-sensory transformations are influenced by
context and the properties of stimuli. For example, neural
responses in frontal motor regions have been observed dur-
ing observation of meaningful actions, contrasted with occipital
activity for meaningless actions (Decety et al., 1997). Relatedly,
when participants mentally rotated their hands, premotor, pri-
mary motor, and posterior parietal cortices were activated.
However, frontal motor areas were silent when they mentally
rotated objects (Kosslyn et al., 1998). These results suggest
that contextual influence and task demands can determine the
implementation of motor simulation in a top-down, voluntary,
strategic way.
In the context of action observation, understand-
ing/comprehension and imitation could be the result of
heuristic engagement of motor simulation. That is, humans
can deploy a top-down mechanism that transfers perceptual
goals into the motor domain and initiates motor simulation to
derive perceptual consequences (Figure 3). The strategic and
heuristic initiation of motor involvement can be considered as a
top-down mental imagery process (possibly exclusive to humans)
(cf. Iacoboni et al., 1999; Papeo et al., 2009), wherein the motor
action is internally simulated and perceptual consequences
estimated thereafter (cf. Tkach et al., 2007).
Modulatory function of motor simulation on perception
The major evidence supporting a modulatory role of motor
simulation in perception (rather than a primary causal role)
comes from lesion studies. For example, lesions in the frontal
lobe only caused deficits in action production, whereas lesions
in the parietal lobe caused deficits both during production and
perception of movement (Heilman et al., 1982). A deficit in
gesture recognition has also been linked to inferior parietal
cortex lesions but not lesions in the frontal lobe (Buxbaum
et al., 2005). Action comprehension also relies on a network
that includes inferior parietal cortex but not IFG (Saygin et al.,
2004). Although patients with IFG lesions demonstrated deficits
in action comprehension in the same study, the static stim-
uli (pictures of pantomimed actions or objects) could require
participants to implement the strategy of motor simulation to
form the dynamic display of action and to derive the perceptual
consequences so that they can fulfill the action-object associ-
ation task. Such lesion results indicate that a damaged motor
system (and the deficits in motor simulation) dissociates from
action-perception and comprehension. The abstract meaning of
motor action is probably “stored” in parietal regions, and the
motor simulation mediated by frontal regions is one of many
paths to access the stored representation (in line with our pro-
posed simulation over frontal cortex and estimation over pari-
etal cortex). Therefore, motor simulation to estimate perceptual
consequences is only modulatory and not necessary for percep-
tual tasks.
Analogous to the advantage of multisensory integration in
minimizing perceptual variance (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Alais
and Burr, 2004; van Wassenhove et al., 2005; von Kriegstein and
Giraud, 2006; Morgan et al., 2008; Poeppel et al., 2008; Fetsch
et al., 2009), the modulatory effects of motor simulation con-
vey benefits by providing additional, more detailed information
to enrich the perceptual representation using internal sequen-
tial estimation mechanism (cf. Mahon and Caramazza, 2008).
Human observers can adopt motor strategies to provide more
precise perceptual representations and deal with perceptual ambi-
guity, for example in the case of speech perception. That is, the
motor simulation and estimation can provide improved priors to
reduce perceptual variance.
In summary, various perceptual tasks can use themotor system
to derive perceptual consequences, by implementing the same
top-down motor simulation and perceptual estimation mecha-
nism, as in mental imagery of speech. We hypothesize that this
motor simulation is modulatory and only serves as one of many
possible corridors to induce perceptual representations. Such
strategies of sensory-to-motor and motor-to-sensory transfor-
mation would be implemented depending on task demands and
contextual influence.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF SOME
DISORDERS
In this section we argue that the internal processes of motor
simulation and estimation, revealed originally for the mental
imagery of speech, can shed light on possible neural correlates
of certain disorders, including auditory hallucinations, stutter-
ing, and phantom limb syndrome. We outline some working
hypotheses regarding these disorders, complementing other exist-
ing hypotheses. It is suggested that the proposed idea for mental
imagery generation, motor simulation, and sequential percep-
tual estimation, points to the practical value of mental imagery
research for understanding the internal mechanisms of such
neural disorders.
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AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS: INTACT ESTIMATION VERSUS BROKEN
MONITORING
Internal simulation and sequential estimation has been proposed
to be a way to distinguish between the perceptual changes
caused by self-generated actions and exogenous external events
(Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004;
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). The perceptual consequences of
intended movement can be predicted, and the processing of
external sensory feedback can be dampened by the internal pre-
diction, such as in the case of speech production (e.g., Houde
et al., 2002; Eliades and Wang, 2003, 2005) and somatosensory
perception in tickling (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998). This sug-
gests that the action-induced perceptual signals are identified as
self-generated and cancelled by the virtually identical represen-
tation generated by internal perceptual prediction. However for
patients suffering from auditory hallucinations, deficits of these
hypothesized dampening mechanisms for self-induced percep-
tual changes have been observed in both somatosensory (e.g.,
Blakemore et al., 2000) and auditory (e.g., Ford et al., 2007;
Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007) domains. These results sug-
gest that patients with auditory hallucinations cannot separate
self-induced from external-induced perceptual signals.
Critically, deficits of distinguishing self-induced from exter-
nally induced perceptual changes are not enough to account for
auditory hallucinations, because the positive symptoms typically
occur in the absence of any external stimuli. There must exist an
internal mechanism to induce the auditory representations that
are then misattributed to an external source/voice. In fact, we
face a similar situation during mental imagery: the neural rep-
resentations mediating perception and mental imagery are very
similar, but there is no mechanism in the perceptual system to
distinguish them. A source monitoring function is required to
keep track of the origins of the perceptual neural representation.
Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher order function monitors
and distinguishes internally versus externally induced neural rep-
resentations. Such a monitoring operation is functionally inde-
pendent from the perceptual estimation process that internally
reconstructs the perceptual representation. Under this hypoth-
esis, auditory hallucinations are caused by incorrect operation
of the monitoring function, resulting in incorrectly labeling the
self-induced auditory representation during the intact internal
perceptual estimation processes.
Computationally, the independence of the monitoring func-
tion versus internal simulation and estimation is demonstrated
by the nuanced differences between corollary discharge and the
efference copy [see the review by Crapse and Sommer (2008)].
The efference copy is a duplicate of the planned motor com-
mand and provides the dynamics of an action trajectory that can
be used to estimate the perceptual consequences (von Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950, 1973). Corollary discharge is a more general
motor related mechanism that can be available at all levels of a
motor process. The corollary discharge does not necessarily con-
tain the same representational information as an efference copy;
rather, it serves as a generic signal to inform sensory-perceptual
systems of the potential occurrence of perceptual changes caused
by one’s own actions (Sperry, 1950). In the case of speech
articulation, these two functions originate at the same stage of
motor simulation, but their functional roles are still separate. The
efference copy is used to estimate the detailed perceptual conse-
quences, whereas the corollary discharge labels the internally and
externally induced perceptual consequences.
Empirically, the finding that auditory hallucination patients
can generate inner speech (e.g., Shergill et al., 2003) demon-
strates the relatively intact motor-to-sensory transformation
function. The neural responses in IFG and superior temporal
gyrus/sulcus (STG/STS) were observed during auditory halluci-
nations, hinting at the derivation of auditory perceptual con-
sequences from motor simulation during the positive symptom
(e.g., McGuire et al., 1993; Shergill et al., 2003). Moreover, the
left lateralization during covert speech versus right lateraliza-
tion during auditory hallucinations offers tantalizing hints about
the independence between self-monitoring and the sequential
simulation-estimation (Sommer et al., 2008).
We summarize the hypothetical mechanistic account for audi-
tory hallucinations (of this type) as follows: when patients prepare
to articulate speech covertly or subvocally (either consciously or
unconsciously), the internal motor simulation leads to percep-
tual estimation (intact efference copy). But the source monitoring
process malfunctions (broken corollary discharge). Therefore, the
internal prediction of a perceptual consequence, which has the
same neural representation as an external perception, is erro-
neously interpreted as the result of external sources, resulting in
an auditory hallucination.
STUTTERING: NOISY ESTIMATION AND CORRECTION PROCESSES
The comparison between internal estimation and external feed-
back provides information to fine-tune motor control. However,
if the internal estimate from motor simulation malfunctions
and generates imprecise perceptual predictions, an inaccurate or
incorrect feedback control signal would be conveyed. Stuttering
could be an example of such erroneous correction. We suggest,
along the lines of similar theories (Max et al., 2004; Hickok et al.,
2011), that one of the neural mechanisms causing stuttering is
a deficit in the motor-to-sensory transformation. That is, the
noisy perceptual estimation is mismatched to the external feed-
back. Such a discrepancy would signal an incorrect error message,
and the feedback control system would interpret such an appar-
ent error as the requirement to correct motor action. Hence,
unnecessary attempts would be performed to modify the cor-
rect articulation, resulting in repetitive/prolonged sound or silent
pauses/blocks.
The noise in the estimation process can come both from the
somatosensory and auditory domains (since there is sequential
estimation). Stutterers showed speed and latency deficits when
required to sequentially update articulator movement (Caruso
et al., 1988). Smaller magnitude compensation with longer
latency adjustment to the perturbation on the jaws was also
observed in stutterers (Caruso et al., 1987). In the auditory
domain, smaller magnitude compensation to the perturbation of
F1 formant in auditory feedback is observed (Cai et al., 2012).
The inaccurate compensation to external perturbation in both
somatosensory and auditory domains (with intact somatosensory
and auditory processes) demonstrates that inaccurate prediction
in both domains could be causal for stuttering.
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Interestingly, dramatically altering auditory feedback (e.g.,
by delaying feedback onset or shifting frequency) can enhance
speech fluency in people who stutter (Martin and Haroldson,
1979; Stuart et al., 1997, 2008). The improvement could be
because the magnitude of error signals is scaled down when
the distance between feedback and prediction is beyond some
threshold, so that fewer correction attempts are made.
PHANTOM LIMBS: MISMATCH BETWEEN INTERNAL ESTIMATION
AND EXTERNAL FEEDBACK
The mismatch between internal prediction and external feedback
could also be caused by an acute change of conditions leading
to the absence of feedback. One such example is the phantom
limb phenomenon, where amputees feel control over a lost limb
(phantom limb) accompanied with chronic and sometimes acute
pain. We hypothesize that the apparent awareness and control of
a lost limb occurs as follows: the missing somatosensory feedback
is “replaced” by the results of internal estimation (cf. Frith et al.,
2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Such a hypothesis is similar to
the mislabeling of the internal estimation as an external percep-
tion (due to the malfunction of source monitoring) in auditory
hallucinations.
The causes of pain in phantom limbs are more intriguing.
The most significant physical changes are loss of propriocep-
tion, or somatosensory afference, after lost limbs. Because motor
control as well as motor simulation of the lost limb are still in
some sense valid (e.g., Raffin et al., 2012), we hypothesize that
a mismatch between the intact internal estimation and absent
external somatosensory feedback can cause the pain associated
with phantom limbs. In fact, consistent with our hypothesis,
limb pain can be induced in normal participants by mismatch-
ing visual and proprioceptive feedback (McCabe et al., 2005)
and spinal cord injured patients report that neuropathic pain
increases while they imagine moving their ankles (Gustin et al.,
2008).
This mismatch hypothesis may represent an intermediate step
between cortical reorganization and pain induction. Lost limbs
cause reorganization in both motor (Maihöfner et al., 2007)
and somatosensory (Maihöfner et al., 2003) cortices, and pain
reduction has been demonstrated to correlate with more granular
organization in the same areas (MacIver et al., 2008). Motor
imagery can lead to cortical reorganization that correlates with
pain reduction in phantom limbs (Moseley, 2006). Seeing the
movement of the opposite functioning arm in amirror can reduce
the pain associated with the phantom limb (Ramachandran et al.,
1995). Such behavioral and psychological training can provide
more precise topographic maps in both motor and somatosen-
sory cortices and hence reduce the inaccurate motor firing caused
by the “take over” effect (e.g., cortex of lip movement expand to
the cortex mediated a lost hand), as well as erroneous somatosen-
sory estimation. The internal estimation hypothesis offers a new
perspective on pain induction. However, there is neither a clear
pain center (Mazzola et al., 2012) nor a mechanistic pain induc-
tion account (Flor, 2002). Further research is needed to under-
stand how the proposed mismatch hypothesis could underpin
pain induction.
CONCLUSION
In this perspective, we argued that mental imagery is an inter-
nal predictive process. Using mental imagery of speech as an
example, we demonstrated a variety of principles underlying
how the mechanism of motor simulation and sequential percep-
tual estimation in mental imagery works. We conclude that the
simulation-estimation mechanism provides a novel conceptual
and practical perspective that allows for new types of research
on predictive functions and sensory-motor integration, as well
as stimulating some new insights into several neural disorders.
Typically, mental imagery has been studied in cognitive psychol-
ogy and cognitive neuroscience, while the concepts of internal
forward models (and sensory-motor integration) are the focus
of motor control research from an engineering perspective. Our
atypical pairing of internal models as an additional source for
mental imagery yields, in our view, some provocative new angles
on mental imagery in both basic research and applied contexts.
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